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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A DIFFERENT “ENLIGHTENED” JURISPRUDENCE?

DAVID R. LOY*
The failure of contemporary criminal justice is not one of technique but of
purpose; what is needed is not simply new programs but new patterns of
1
thinking.

INTRODUCTION
Within the last generation or so, “Enlightenment” has taken on a new
meaning. Today the English word refers to more than the Aufklärung
movement in eighteenth-century Europe, which offered a rationalistic critique
of traditional values and institutions;2 “enlightenment” has become the most
common translation of various Asian (especially Buddhist) terms that describe
spiritual awakening and liberation: bodhi, nirvana, satori, moksha, and so
forth.3
This double meaning is fortuitous for my response to john powell’s
groundbreaking lecture Remaking Law: Moving Beyond Enlightenment
Jurisprudence, which addresses the limitations and flaws inherent in
contemporary jurisprudence insofar as it is rooted in an understanding of
rationality and human nature that has become questionable. I would like to
broaden the context of powell’s thesis by offering a (not the) Buddhist
perspective on his critique. I intend to demonstrate that a Buddhist perspective
has much to contribute to the new paradigm that powell is working towards. In
an increasingly globalized world, it is important that our jurisprudence no
longer be tied exclusively to a European worldview that is now somewhat
dated, but should instead be informed by the best that other cultures have
developed. Among that best are the sophisticated religious and philosophical
traditions of South Asia and East Asia. The Buddhist perspective that follows
is offered as an example of such a non-Western perspective.

* Besl Family Chair Professor, Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio. My gratitude to john powell
for his insightful article, to Professor Goldstein for inviting me to participate in this Childress
Symposium, and to all the organizers and panelists who made the event so successful.
1. MARTIN WRIGHT, JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 159 (1991).
2. See James Van Horn Melton, From Enlightenment to Revolution: Hertzberg, Schlözer,
and the Problem of Despotism in the Late Aufklärung, 12 CENT. EUR. HIST. 103, 103 (1979).
3. Enlightenment (concept), The New World Encyclopedia, http://www.newworld
encyclopedia.org/entry/Enlightenment_%28concept%29 (last visited May 21, 2010).
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One reason alternative worldviews are important is that they give us an
alternative perspective to our own worldview—one that we may have been
unable to see because we identify with it so completely that we see through it.
From a Buddhist perspective, for example, the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism,
Christianity, Islam) are not only monotheistic, but are also ethically
preoccupied in a way that non-theistic traditions, such as Buddhism, are not.4
God’s main way of relating to human beings is mandatory morality, which
entails preoccupation with disobedience and punishment, beginning with the
sin and expulsion of Adam and Eve.5 Historically, God’s most important
communication is, of course, the Decalogue, the set (actually, two sets are
mentioned) of Ten Commandments.6 If we obey them, he will reward us,
usually with eternal life in heaven; if we do not obey them, he will punish us,
perhaps with eternal torment in hell.7 In short, Abrahamic monotheism is
largely transcendentally based ethics.
There is a curious and perhaps not incidental parallel between this role of
God and the role of the modern state. According to the Abrahamic
understanding, my violence against a fellow human being is not primarily an
offense against him or her, but it is rather a violation of God’s law.8 Substitute
“the state” for “God” and the same is true for contemporary jurisprudence.
The relationship between the two people involved is mediated by a third and
more impersonal party. The conclusion of this essay will return to this parallel.
In contrast, although a non-theistic and non-dualistic religion such as
Buddhism includes moral precepts, these precepts are not central in the same
way. Moral behavior provides a foundation for following the religious path,
yet an ethical life is not the same as an enlightened one.9 For example,
Buddhism distinguishes the fruits of good karma from spiritual “awakening:”
“the Buddha” literally means “the Awakened one.”10 In place of a duality

4. John D’Arcy May, Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Religious Pluralism: Buddhist
and Christian Perspectives, 26 BUDDHIST–CHRISTIAN STUD. 51, 54 (2006) (discussing how
Buddhism focuses on the “endless cycle of rebirth” whereas Christianity focuses on sin and
redemption).
5. A SYNOPSIS OF THE BOOKS OF ADAM AND EVE 2–5E (Gary A. Anderson & Michael E.
Stone eds., 2d rev. ed., 1999) (presenting the story of Adam and Eve’s expulsion).
6. Roger E. Van Harn, Preface to THE TEN COMMANDMENTS FOR JEWS, CHRISTIANS, AND
OTHERS, at i, xii (Roger E. Van Harn ed., 2007) (presenting the Ten Commandments).
7. EDUARD NIELSEN, THE TEN COMMANDMENTS IN NEW PERSPECTIVE 1 (Studies in
Biblical Theory Second Series No. 7, 1968) (describing how the Ten Commandments were used
to inspire a fear in God and be a model for Christian living, especially in countries with a
Lutheran tradition).
8. See Van Harn, supra note 6, at xii (describing how the Ten Commandments are a
covenant with the Lord and that covenant requires the love for God and one’s neighbor).
9. ELIZABETH J. HARRIS, WHAT BUDDHISTS BELIEVE 51 (1998) (explaining that ethical
living is only the “practical foundation” of the Eightfold path).
10. HUSTON SMITH & PHILIP NOVAK, BUDDHISM: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 4 (2003).
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between good and evil, the Buddha emphasizes the distinction between
delusion, which causes suffering, and the wisdom that is the only real solution
to our unhappiness.11 Expressed less dualistically, the Buddhist emphasis is on
being aware rather than being good. The presumption is that an externallyenforced moral code is no longer necessary insofar as we awaken to our true
nature; we will not be inclined to harm or take advantage of others once we
realize our non-duality with them. This perspective is more Socratic than
Abrahamic: the crucial issue is not one’s will but one’s understanding.12
This difference between the Abrahamic and Buddhist traditions enables us
to ask just how secular and “religiously neutral” our Enlightenment-based
jurisprudence actually is. Is it a coincidence that what is by far the world’s
most “religious” modern nation is also by far the world’s most punitive?13
Although God has been expunged from Western legal codes, this world is still
seen as a place where the fundamental issue is the struggle between good and
evil and that the task of good people is to apprehend and punish the bad people
at the root of our social problems (e.g., drug addicts).14 Much of the attraction
of this moralistic worldview, I suspect, is that it is such an easy and reassuring
way to make sense of a world that is complicated and confusing.15 An
alternative viewpoint is offered by Ronnie Earle, longtime District Attorney of
Austin, Texas: “Anyone with any sense who has ever spent much time dealing
with criminals knows that most criminal behavior is the result of anger, shame,
poverty, and child abuse.”16 Why has it been so difficult for our judicial
system to adapt to this obvious truth—to become more restorative and
community-oriented? Is it because his insight is incompatible with a taken-forgranted worldview that is preoccupied with distinguishing the bad (offenders,

11. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 42–43.
12. Id. at 42–44 (describing the process of knowing “what human existence really is”).
13. See NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNITIVE STATE, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND
IMPRISONMENT ACROSS THE UNITED STATES, at vii (2006).
14. See generally Peter Reuter, Hawks Ascendant: The Punitive Trend of American Drug
Policy, 121 POLITICAL PHARMACOLOGY: THINKING ABOUT DRUGS 15, 17 (1992) (discussing the
expenditures in the war on drugs).
15. Ironically, this simplistic duality between good and evil has often resulted in more evil.
What were Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot trying to accomplish? Each of them wanted to perfect his
society by eliminating the evil elements that interfered with its reconstruction. See Betty Glad,
Why Tyrants Go Too Far: Militant Narcissism & Absolute Power, 23 POL. PSYCHOL. 1, 2 n.2
(2002) (noting that Hitler, Stalin, and Pol Pot shared similar characteristics). Of course, it is easy
to dismiss (or demonize?) all three as evil themselves, but that does not inoculate us from falling
into the same trap of demonizing others who disagree with our values and goals.
16. Ronnie Earle, Restorative Justice Restores Power to Communities, TIKKUN Sept.–Oct.
2009, available at http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/sept_oct_09_earle. (reviewing SUNNY
SCHWARTZ & DAVID BOODELL, DREAMS FROM THE MONSTER FACTORY: A TALE OF PRISON,
REDEMPTION, AND ONE WOMAN’S FIGHT TO RESTORE JUSTICE TO ALL (2009)).
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who in secular terminology may no longer be sinful but are nonetheless guilty)
from the good (the rest of us)?
I. A BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE
The Buddhist approach to jurisprudence cannot really be separated from
the Buddhist understanding of human psychology (especially motivation and
intention), from its conception of the relationship between the individual and
society, or from its vision of human possibility: what a good life is, or can be.17
This suggests that the challenge of creating a good judicial system may not
solely be a secular challenge, insofar as issues of fairness and justice cannot be
completely separated from the religious perspectives from which they are
historically derived. In the past, and still today for the vast majority of people,
ideas about justice are inextricably bound up with religious views and
customs.18 Justice is one of those ultimate questions (like boundary issues,
such as when life begins and ends) that bridge whatever distinctions we try to
make between the sacred and the secular. It is no historical accident that
restorative justice programs are so often promoted by marginalized Christian
groups (e.g., Quakers and Mennonites) with alternative theologies.19
There are predominant themes that recur in any Buddhist analysis:
offenders should be treated sympathetically because all of us, offenders and
victims alike, have the same Buddha-nature. We are often dominated by
greed, malice, and delusion (the “three poisons” or “roots of evil”), but it is
possible to transform and outgrow them. Hence, the fundamental issue at stake
in society’s response to crime is education and reformation of the character
rather than punishment (“paying one’s debt to society”).20 These themes
derive from the Buddhist understanding of the self, an understanding which is
distinctive and perhaps unique in its emphasis.
Buddhism begins not with sin or disobedience but with dukkha—a Pali
term usually translated as “suffering”—that is understood broadly to include a
basic dissatisfaction that permeates our lives until we “wake up.”21 Basically,
Buddhists believe that the nature of an unawakened mind is to be bothered by

17. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 55 (discussing the Buddhist path of “pulling out the roots of
greed, hatred and delusion” by virtuous living, obtained by conditioning and changing one’s
“thought processes”).
18. MONICA K. MILLER, RELIGION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1–4 (2006) (describing how
religion affects the justice system both in and outside the courtroom).
19. Malcolm Thorburn, The Impossible Dreams and Modest Reality of Restorative Justice,
Review of Annalise Acorn, Compulsory Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice, 30
QUEEN’S L.J. 863, 875 (2005).
20. HARRIS, supra note 9, at 55.
21. Id. at 42–44.
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something.22 Our most troublesome dukkha is connected with our sense of
self, the fundamental delusion.23 In more contemporary terms, the sense of an
“I” separate from the rest of the world—that I am inside and other people are
outside—is a psycho-social construct better understood as a confluence of
interacting mental and physical processes, something modern psychology has
also realized. According to Buddhism, such a self is inherently insecure and
uncomfortable because it is not only ungrounded, but “ungroundable”: it is not
a “thing” that ever could become secure.24 This points to the ultimate source
of our anxiety, which we usually experience as a lack. The sense of self is
haunted by a sense of lack—the feeling that “something is wrong with me” or
“something is missing in my life.” How I objectify that sense of lack,
however, varies according to the kind of person I am and the society into
which I have been socialized. Growing up in the United States today, for
example, I am likely to learn that my problem is that I don’t have enough
money—something that would not have bothered, for example, many preColumbian Native Americans. For Buddhism, the basic misconception that
causes us so much trouble is the belief that what is lacking is something
outside myself, whereas the only truly satisfactory resolution of my dukkha is
to realize that there is no discrete “I” separate from other people and the rest of
the world. We must understand that we are not merely interconnected, but
parts of each other, manifestations that reflect each other.
This has obvious and important implications for any judicial system. If our
basic predicament is cognitive rather than ethical, what is needed is not
punishment but instead some type of educational process (in the broadest
sense) that encourages personal transformation. A punitive incarceration
system that actually harms most offenders—and it is difficult to argue
otherwise25—is no more justifiable than it is effective. Instead of labeling

22. Id. at 42–43 (describing the un-awakened mind as “not knowing what human existence
really is” and detailing its consequences).
23. Id. at 43 (explaining the delusion as seeing everything through “I,” “me,” and “mine”).
24. NUMERICAL DISCOURSES OF THE BUDDHA: AN ANTHOLOGY OF SUTTAS FROM THE
ANGUTTARA NIKAYA 18–19 (Nyanaponika Thera & Bhikku Bodhi eds. & trans. 1999)
[hereinafter NUMERICAL DISCOURSES OF THE BUDDHA].
25. The Quakers may have intended the penitentiary to be a place of penitence, yet that
meaning has long been lost, and there is little doubt that incarceration makes most offenders
worse. A RAND Corporation report, Prisons Versus Probation in California, found that
recidivism is actually higher for offenders sent to prison than for similar offenders put on
probation. JOAN PETERSILIA ET. AL., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PRISON
VERSUS PROBATION IN CALIFORNIA vii (1986), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/
R3323/. The predatory societies that “correctional institutions” encourage make most of them
more like hell than places to repent and reform. See HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW
FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 37 (3d ed. 2005). Prison settings dehumanize and seldom offer
opportunities for prisoners to deal with their feelings of guilt and their need for forgiveness. Id.
Many prisoners feel that they have been treated badly (and many have), which diverts their
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people as good or bad, Buddhist psychology understands the sense of self as
impermanent and malleable; it emphasizes the force of habit in place of
autonomous self-determination.26 According to Shakyamuni, the historical
Buddha, we all have a variety of human tendencies, some of which (greed, ill
will, the delusion that we are separate from each other) should be minimized,
while others (generosity, loving-kindness, the wisdom of our non-duality)
should be encouraged and developed: that is how we can reconstruct ourselves.
Is this approach too idealistic? Just the opposite, I think. It involves a
realistic and practical attitude towards human weakness. According to
Buddhism, it is the nature of unenlightened human beings to be afflicted by
craving, malice, and delusion. In other words, all of us are mentally ill to some
extent. There can be no presumption of Descartes’s transparent selfconsciousness or unfettered self-determination. As long as human beings are
unenlightened, there will be crime. The extent of crime can be reduced by
improving social and economic conditions, but no human society should ever
expect to eradicate it.
If we are all somewhat insane, then the insanity defense is always
somewhat applicable. Genuine freedom is not a matter of liberating the
individual will (often motivated by greed, ill will, and/or delusion); it is a result
of overcoming that kind of willfulness—not to be gained simply by removing
external restraints—and, ultimately, a consequence of awakening to our nonduality and interdependence.
This challenges the moralistic distinction we are usually quick to make
between an offender and the rest of us. In judicial terms, it raises questions
about our preoccupation with the black-or-white question of guilty/not guilty.
“Degrees of severity of the offense may vary, but, in the end, there are no
degrees of guilt. One is guilty or not guilty.”27 Such either/or situations,
Howard Zehr observes, teach “the hidden message that people can be
evaluated in simplistic dichotomies.”28
The question of guilt is the hub of the entire criminal justice process.
Establishing guilt is the central activity, and everything moves toward or flows
from that event. . . . The centrality of guilt means that the actual outcome of the
case receives less attention. Legal training concentrates on rules and processes
related to guilt, and law students receive little training in sentence-negotiation
29
or design.

attention from what they have done to their victims, who also lose the opportunity to work toward
closure. See id. at 44. Moreover, prison reinforces the low self-confidence and sense of failure
that lead many prisoners to offend. See id.
26. NUMERICAL DISCOURSES OF THE BUDDHA, supra note 24, at 14.
27. ZEHR, supra note 25, at 67.
28. Id. (citing NILS CHRISTIE, LIMITS TO PAIN 45 (1981)).
29. Id. at 66.
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From a perspective that takes the offender’s self-reformation seriously, such an
approach is seriously flawed:
[O]ffenders are constantly confronted with the terminology of guilt, but denied
the language and clarity of meaning to make sense of it. . . . Western law and
values often are predicated on a belief in the individual as a free moral agent. If
someone commits a crime, she has done so willfully. Punishment is thus
deserved because it is freely chosen. Individuals are personally and
individually accountable. Guilt is individual. . . . Much evidence suggests that
offenders often do not act freely or at least do not perceive themselves as
capable of free action. . . . Ideas of human freedom and thus responsibility
30
necessarily take on a different hue in such a context.

A Buddhist perspective supports the notion that preoccupation with guilt is
based on an erroneous understanding of human nature and conclusion about
the best way to change human nature.31 “Guilt says something about the
quality of the person . . . and has a ‘sticky,’ indelible quality. Guilt adheres to
a person more or less permanently, with few known solvents. It often becomes
a primary, definitional characteristic of a person.”32
In contrast, the Buddhist emphasis on impermanence and the
insubstantiality of everything (very much including the sense of self) implies
that one’s character is a never-ending process, for there is nothing indelible
about our unwholesome mental tendencies.33 Deep-rooted habits become
difficult to eradicate because they are a residue of past actions and ways of
thinking, not because they are an immutable part of us.
If free will is not presumed and encouraging self-reformation is the most
important issue, primary concern shifts from ruling on the suspect’s guilt to
determining his or her intention (cetana). By no coincidence, intention—more
precisely, volitional action—is also the most important factor in the operation
of the law of karma, according to Buddhism.34 The basic point about karma is
that each person is “the owner of his actions, the heir of his actions; his actions
are the womb (from which he has sprung), his relations and his protection.
Whatever he does, good or bad, he will be heir to that.”35 This doctrine is
complex and controversial, but any Buddhist understanding of karma will
emphasize what Buddhism calls sankharas—our “mental formations” or
habitual tendencies.36 The notion that the sense of self is a construct means
that these tendencies are not something the self has but tendencies that the
30. Id. at 70.
31. Richard H. Jones, Theravada Buddhism and Morality, 47 J. AM. ACAD. RELIGION 371,
373 (1979).
32. ZEHR, supra note 25, at 69.
33. Jones, supra note 31, at 373.
34. NUMERICAL DISCOURSES OF THE BUDDHA, supra note 24, at 17.
35. Id. at 141.
36. Id. at 19.
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sense of self is: the usually-habitual expression and interaction of these
tendencies is what constitutes my sense of “me.” That does not mean such
sankharas are ineradicable: unwholesome ones are to be differentiated from
the liberatory possibilities that are available when one makes the effort to
replace them with more wholesome mental tendencies.37
The important point about this explication of karma is that we suffer or
benefit most not for what we have done, but for what we have become, and
that what we intentionally do is what makes us what we are. At that point, the
important issue becomes the development of those intentions: just as food is
assimilated to (re)constitute my physical body, so “my” volitional actions
(re)constitute my character. If karma points to this psychological truth about
how we (re)construct ourselves, then, to say it again, the focus of our judicial
systems should shift from retributive punishment to reformation and education
in the broadest sense.
The classic—although flawed—example of Buddhist reformation is the
Angulimala Sutta,38 one of the earliest Buddhist texts. Angulimala was a
merciless bandit and serial killer who wore the fingers of his victims as a
garland (hence his name, literally “finger garland”).39 When Angulimala
encounters the Buddha, however, the Buddha performs a feat of supernatural
power. Angulimala, walking as fast as he can, cannot catch up with him, even
though the Buddha is walking at his normal pace. Astonished, Angulimala
calls out “Stop!”40
Still walking, the Buddha answers: “I have stopped, Angulimala, you stop
too.”41 In response to Angulimala’s puzzlement, he explains: “I have stopped
forever, I abstain from violence towards living beings; but you have no
restraint towards things that live.”42 This implausibly impresses Angulimala so
much that he renounces evil forever and asks to join the Buddhist monastic
order, and the Buddha welcomes him as a new bhikkhu (monk).43
Meanwhile, King Pasadeni has gone forth to capture Angulimala with a
cavalry of five hundred men.44 When he meets the Buddha and explains his
quest, the Buddha responds: if you were to see that he is now a good bhikkhu,
who abstains from killing living beings, how would you treat him?45 The king

37. See id.
38. THE MIDDLE LENGTH DISCOURSES OF THE BUDDHA: A NEW TRANSLATION OF THE
MAJJHIMA NIKAYA (Bhikkhu Nanamoli & Bhikkhu Bodhi trans., 1995) [hereinafter MIDDLE
LENGTH DISCOURSES OF THE BUDDHA].
39. Id. at 710.
40. Id. at 711.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 711.
43. MIDDLE LENGTH DISCOURSES OF THE BUDDHA, supra note 38, at 711–12.
44. See id. at 712.
45. See id. at 712–13.
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replies that he would pay homage to him as a good bhikkhu and is surprised
when the Buddha points out Angulimala seated nearby.46 The king marvels
that the Buddha was able to tame the untamed and bring peace to the
unpeaceful.47 “[W]e ourselves could not tame him with force or weapons, yet
the Blessed One has tamed him without force or weapons.”48 The king then
departs, after paying homage to the Buddha.49
Soon after, the now venerable Angulimala, diligent and resolute, realizes
for himself the “supreme goal of the holy life” and attains nirvana.50 Later,
while collecting alms, he is attacked and beaten by irate townspeople.51 The
Buddha tells him to “[b]ear it,” for it is a result of his past karma.52 The sutra
concludes with some verses Angulimala utters while experiencing the bliss of
enlightenment, for example:
Who checks the evil deeds he did
By doing wholesome deeds instead,
He illuminates the world
53
Like the moon freed from a cloud.

This legend is obviously more embellished myth than historical truth,
though some scholars suspect that it may have a factual basis.54 It is also
flawed in two ways: Angulimala’s change of heart is too easy, of course, and,
more importantly, unsatisfactory from a restorative point of view. The sutta
says nothing about the families of Angulimala’s victims or the larger social
consequences of his crimes. That the humble monk Angulimala is stoned by
villagers indicates more than bad karma. It implies that there has been no
attempt at restorative or transformative justice that takes account of his effects
on society. The social fabric of the community has been torn, yet the particular
situation of the offender is addressed by abstracting him from his social
context and from those affected by his offenses.
Nevertheless, the importance of this story within the Buddhist tradition
highlights the only reason Buddhism accepts for punishing an offender: to help
reform his or her character. Then there is no reason to punish someone who
has already reformed himself. There is no mention of punishment as a
deterrent. On the contrary, the case of Angulimala may be seen as setting a
46. See id. at 713.
47. See id.
48. MIDDLE LENGTH DISCOURSES OF THE BUDDHA, supra note 38, at 713–14.
49. See id. at 714.
50. See id. at 714–15.
51. See id. at 715.
52. Id.
53. MIDDLE LENGTH DISCOURSES OF THE BUDDHA, supra note 38, at 715.
54. See RICHARD F. GOMBRICH, HOW BUDDHISM BEGAN: THE CONDITIONED GENESIS OF
THE EARLY TEACHINGS 135–64 (1996) (examining multiple versions of the sutta to discover the
truth behind Angulimala myth).
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negative example, implying that one can escape punishment by becoming a
bhikkhu, as if the Buddhist sangha were something like the French foreign
legion. There is no hint that punishment is needed to annul the crime, although
Angulimala does suffer karmic consequences, which even his nirvana cannot
escape. More generally, determining which judicial response is right or
wrong—what is just—cannot be abstracted from the particular situation of the
offender, including his social context.
II. TIBETAN JURISPRUDENCE
Traditional Tibetan jurisprudence (i.e., prior to 1950) provides an example
of how well a Buddhist-based jurisprudence can function to maintain social
order and harmony.55 The presupposition of Tibet’s legal system was that
conflict is engendered by our incorrect vision of situations, a vision itself
caused by mental afflictions.56 In Tibetan Buddhist teachings there are six root
afflictions (desire, anger, pride, ignorance, doubt, and incorrect view) and
twenty secondary afflictions (including belligerence, resentment, spite,
jealousy, and deceit) that cause us to misperceive the world and engage in
disputes.57 To say it again, this is a Socratic-like understanding of human
conflict: our unethical behavior is ultimately due to our wrong understanding,
which only a spiritual awakening can wholly purify.
As long as our vision is incorrect and our minds are afflicted, there can be
no question of free will, and Tibet’s judicial system did not presuppose it.
“The goal of a legal proceeding was to calm the minds and relieve the anger of
the disputants and then—through catharsis, expiation, restitution, and
appeasement—to rebalance the natural order.”58 A judge’s responsibility was
not to maintain a supposedly impartial neutrality (contra Chief Justice John
Roberts’ self-declared approach, according to john powell)59 but to supervise
this process of calming and reharmonizing.60 “A primary purpose of trial

55. See REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF
BUDDHIST TIBET 138 (1995) (noting that traditional Tibet strove for consent and agreement
between the parties of a dispute in order to “reharmonize themselves and the community after a
bitter fight”).
56. See id. at 73.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 74.
59. john a. powell & Stephen Menendian, Remaking Law: Moving Beyond Enlightenment
Jurisprudence, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1035, 1035–36 (2010).
60. See FRENCH, supra note 55, at 137–38 (stating that judges would seek for the parties
within a dispute to reach a consensus as to the facts within a case); see also id. at 139 (indicating
that consensus brought reharmonization and helped to “dispel the parties’ mental afflictions, such
as anger or jealousy”).
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procedure was to uncover mental states if possible, and punishment was
understood in terms of its effect upon the mind of the defendant.”61
This included the disputants attempting to reharmonize their relations after
a court settlement. For example, the law codes specified a “getting together
payment” to finance a meeting where all the parties would drink and eat
together to promote reconciliation.62 Generally, coercion was considered
ineffective, for no one could be forced to follow a moral path.63 The disputants
had to work out their own difficulties to find a true solution and end the
conflict.64 Therefore, even a decision accepted by all parties would lose its
finality whenever they no longer agreed to it, and cases could be reopened at
any later date.65
This focus on ending strife and calming the mind implied a different
attitude towards the use of legal precedents. Emphasis was on decisions
harmonizing the group, rather than on decisions in harmony with more abstract
legal principles.66 In general, local and nongovernmental decision makers
were believed to be likely to find solutions that would actually rectify behavior
and work within the community to restore harmony.67
Reharmonizing was embodied both in the legal philosophy and in the
different types of judicial processes used to settle problems. Legal analysis
followed Buddhist teachings in distinguishing two basic forms of causation:
the immediate cause and the root cause.68 Because the source of animosity
between the parties had to be addressed to resolve the conflict, the root cause
was generally considered the more important form of causation.69 Internal
settlement between the parties was the most common type of judicial process.70

61. Id. at 76.
62. See id. at 139.
63. Under Buddhism, individuals had the choice to act morally or immorally, but the
individual’s choice had consequences on his karma. Id. at 76.
64. FRENCH, supra note 55, at 138 (“A civil suit could not be addressed in most forums
without the consent of both parties. A case was not considered settled until there was agreement
as to the facts, and a judicial decision (even in a murder case) had a subsequent requirement of
consensus among all parties.”).
65. Id. at 139 (“[E]ven after a signed document had been issued by a conciliator or a court,
the case could be reconsidered by the parties at any later date.”).
66. Id. at 137. For instance, “truth” was based on consensus between the disagreeing parties
rather than an ideal or separate standard: “facts given by both sides had to agree, not with reality
(in any corresponding sense) but with each other.” Id.
67. Id. at 319–25. In order to rectify behavior and restore harmony within the community,
five core concepts were considered in criminal cases: “(1) the uniqueness of each case; (2) ‘what
is suitable for punishment’; (3) considerations of karma; (4) the correct purposes of punishment;
and (5) the correct types of punishment.” Id. at 316.
68. Id. at 142.
69. FRENCH, supra note 55, at 142.
70. Id. at 121.
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If internal settlement attempts failed, conciliation, using private and unofficial
conciliators, could be tried. Parties generally preferred this process because it
was informal, saved reputations, allowed flexible compromises, and was much
less expensive.71 Official court proceedings were a last resort.72
Emphasis on consensus and calming the mind also presupposed something
generally accepted in Tibet but less so in the West today: a belief that only the
mind, and not material possessions or status relations, that can bring us
happiness.73 This contrast highlights the more individualistic assumptions that
operate in American judicial systems, which instead emphasize the personal
pursuit of happiness, freedom from restraint by others, and the right to enjoy
one’s property without interference. In practice, Tibetan officials were careful
to distinguish religious beliefs from secular legal views when it came to
settling a case; crimes and disputes had to be settled in this world, without
referring to karmic causes or effects, which are ultimately unknowable.74
Nonetheless, Tibetan culture was permeated with a spiritual mentality; the
moral example and standard of the Buddha influenced every part of the legal
system.75
Stories, parables, and jataka tales (accounts of the Buddha’s former lives)
offered countless social examples of how the virtuous and the nonvirtuous
actor operated in the daily world and provided Tibetans with a concrete
understanding of proper action. Each Tibetan knew that the moral Buddhist
cared more for the welfare of others than for his or her own welfare, gave to
others rather than amassing a fortune, rigorously tried to prevent harm to
others, never engaged in any of the nonvirtuous acts, had complete devotion to
the Buddha and his path, worked to eliminate anger and desire for material
goods, accepted problems with patience and endurance, and remained an
enthusiastic perseverer in the quest for truth and enlightenment. As there was
no confusion about this ideal, there was little ambiguity about how the moral
actor would deal with a particular daily situation. Even though the average
Tibetan may not have been any more likely to follow the moral path than a
person in any other society, his or her understanding of that ideal path
remained strong. Moreover, that understanding prevailed in reasoning about
76
legal cases, even over reasoning connected with community standards.

Insofar as all societies require models of how to live, like norms and
sanctions, what comparable standards prevail in Western cultures? Despite a
plurality of models, Western standards tend to be more competitive and
atomistic. In United States law, for example, “the question becomes ‘Would a

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 122.
Id.
Id. at 75.
FRENCH, supra note 55, at 81.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
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reasonable person leave ice on the sidewalk and foresee harm to a passerby?’
The court and the individuals are not expected to know or to ask the moral
question ‘What would a correctly acting moral human have done under the
same circumstances?’”77 By contrast, the accepted standard in Tibet was based
not on “the reasonable man,” but on the moral person exercising self control.78
The members of a Tibetan village or neighborhood recognized that they had
responsibility for other members of the group; conversely, an adult in the
United States has no legal duty or responsibility to help others unless there are
special circumstances.79 “Tibetans find such an attitude repulsive and
inhuman.”80
To sum up, traditional Tibet provides an example of a judicial system
organized according to a very different type of jurisprudence, one which
emphasized reformation of character and restoration of social harmony.
Nevertheless, any attempt we might make to incorporate those principles into
Western jurisprudence would seem to be vitiated by one obvious problem:
Buddhist Tibet was not a secular society.81 As Rebecca Redwood French
emphasizes, Tibet did not have an autonomous legal system, for its framework
of “legal cosmology” was derived from the Tibetan worldview—a worldview
which was almost entirely embedded in a Buddhist cultural base.82 For a
Tibetan, then, there was no clear division between religion and the state.83
Such a system is difficult to harmonize with modern Western judicial systems,
which have evolved to fit secular and pluralistic societies.84 For the United
States, in particular, a distinction between religious affiliation and civil
authority is essential.85
But how sharp is that distinction? Is our jurisprudence an “Enlightened”
secular alternative to such a religiously based legal cosmology, or is it merely
unaware of its own religious origins and commitments? There is nothing
unique about Tibet’s legal system being derived from its worldview; that fact
is true of any legal system. Ours, too, is embedded in a particular worldview,
which we take for granted just as much as Tibetans assume a Buddhist
cosmology. My concluding section reflects on whether, for us, the role of the
Buddha in Tibet has been assumed by the state. This implies a rather different
perspective on modern judicial systems.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 80.
Id. at 79.
FRENCH, supra note 55, at 141–42.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 346.
Id.
FRENCH, supra note 55, at 16.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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III. A GENEALOGY OF JUSTICE
[L]aw is our national religion; lawyers constitute our priesthood; the courtroom
86
is our cathedral, where contemporary passion plays are enacted.

Our understanding of justice, like every understanding of justice, is
historically constructed. If we want to reconstruct our jurisprudence, then it is
important to understand how we got to where we are now. But there is no
“perspectiveless” perspective. A Buddhist concern for a more reformative and
restorative justice enables us to see the history of jurisprudence in a new way.
In premodern Anglo-Saxon and Germanic law, the notion of a wrong to a
person or his family was primary and that of an offense against the “common
wealth,” was secondary.87 In other words, the distinction between civil and
criminal law hardly existed, even for the gravest offenses. For example, the
notion that killing is a crime—an offense against the community—did not exist
until the state gained the power to enforce penalties for such offenses.88 As
monarchies grew more powerful, private settlements of crimes that rulers
regarded as public wrongs were not permitted because these settlements were
understood to undermine the crown’s authority.89 Centralization of the
crown’s power meant that kings could assume the judicial role and enforce
their judgments.90
This was justified by their new royal role as
personifications of the social order: “the king, in whom centers the majesty of
the whole community, is supposed by law to be the person injured by every
infraction of the public rights belonging to that community.”91
This development was reinforced by another in the religious sphere.92
Christianity initially emphasized the importance of forgiving wrongdoing.93
Like Buddhism, early Christian practice was focused on the importance of
reconciliation within a social context, emphasizing spiritual salvation and
one’s ultimate destiny.94 Beginning in the eleventh century, however, theology
and common law began to redefine crime as an offense against the divine

86. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?: RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT
LAWYERS, 9 (1983).
87. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 2. “The Anglo-Saxons adopted the principle, also found
among Germanic tribes, that offenders should make two payments of composition for injuries
other than homicide, bót to the injured party and wite to the lord or king.” Id. at 3.
88. Id. at 5–6. In 1255, Henry III began to impose monetary penalties for murder. Id. at 4.
89. Id. at 4. King Henry II in response to concerns with judicial and administrative reforms,
“claimed jurisdiction over the main crimes (‘pleas of the crown’) such as homicide, robbery and
rape.” Id. at 5.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 6 (citing Blackstone 1778/1973: 187, 192).
92. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 6.
93. Id.
94. Id.; see also VIRGINIA MACKEY, PUNISHMENT: IN THE SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION OF
JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 18 (1983).
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order, that created a moral imbalance that needed to be righted, which meant
retribution.95 Crime became a sin against God and, as such, it became a part of
the responsibility of the Church (God’s agent on earth).96 Here, too, the focus
shifted away from reharmonizing the relationship between offender and
offended. Now their relationship is mediated and objectified, because the
offense is really against God.97
These two developments intersected in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, when the Reformation initiated a social crisis that culminated in the
birth of the nation–state as we know it today.98 The schism within
Christendom increased the leverage of civil rulers, and the balance of power
between Church (sacred authority) and state (secular authority) shifted
dramatically to the latter.99 This shift allowed some rulers to appropriate the
Church’s traditional role and prestige. Their power became absolute because
they filled the new vacuum of spiritual authority by becoming, in effect,
“secular gods” accountable not to the Pope but only to God.100
Thanks to reformers such as Luther and Calvin, who postulated a vast gap
between corrupt humanity and God’s righteousness, the deity was now too far
away to interfere with the absolute authority of secular rulers.101 Luther and
Calvin also endorsed the punitive role of the state, which assumed what
remained of God’s role in administering punishment.102
Eventually, of course, various revolutions overthrew these absolute rulers,
but their supreme power did not disappear; rather, the power remained
centralized in the impersonal authority of the modern state, and its institutions
were freed from responsibility to anything outside themselves since they now
“represented the people.”103
This gives us a different perspective on the state’s role as the legal victim
of all crimes, with a monopoly on the determination and application of justice.
Can the modern nation–state be understood as a solely secular institution, or is
our historically conditioned allegiance to it due to the fact that it took over
some of the religious authority of schismatic Christianity? The impersonality
of state justice led to emphasis on formal law and due process, which meant a
focus on bureaucratic results (and thus on legal precedent) with little regard for

95. MACKEY, supra note 94, at 41–43.
96. Id. at 20.
97. STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, COSMOPOLIS: THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF MODERNITY 57 (1990).
98. Id. at 89–91.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 90–91.
101. Wolfgang Reinhard, Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and the Early Modern State: A
Reassessment, 75 CATH. HIST. REV. 383, 385–87 (1989).
102. Jesse Couenhoven, Grace as Pardon and Power: Pictures of the Christian Life in
Luther, Calvin and Barth, 28 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 63, 68 (2000).
103. TOULMIN, supra note 97, at 97.
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the effects of this process on its participants.104 The objectivity of bureaucratic
procedure engendered trust in the institution, which took the form of law and
respect for law. But there was a price:
As trust diminishes among individuals, bureaucracies, particularly legal
bureaucracies, become more integral to the maintenance of social order and
ultimately to the existence of society itself. In this context, law can be viewed
as being inversely related to personal trust. With respect to trust, bureaucracy
105
can be viewed as the antithesis of community.

Today, too, the breakdown of local communities continues to create “mobile
and atomized populations whose claim to humanity rests more and more on the
assertion of individual rights vis-à-vis an impersonal, distant, and highly
bureaucratized government apparatus.”106
Within the context of liberalism, we are controlled by atomism and contract.
Our unity with others is based almost exclusively on the belief that such an
association will advance our own self-interest. In our rational assessment of
situations, we are therefore unlikely to enter into a relationship with an
individual who is unable, at least theoretically, to advance our own interests.
Such an unwillingness of our part excludes those with little power and few
assets from engaging in contractual relations, thus creating the social problems
(e.g., crime, poverty, unemployment, etc.) that have plagued the liberal
democracies. In our unwillingness to involve ourselves personally with such
individuals, we have surrendered community control of these problems to the
107
state.

Our unwillingness to engage with the poor and powerless follows naturally
from the belief that our own well-being is separate from their well-being—a
duality and delusion that “karmically” returns to haunt us.
All this implies a different perspective on Hobbes’s social contract
theory,108 which may not be reliable as an historical claim but is nonetheless
revealing. Hobbes offers a view of human nature very different from
Buddhism: our distinctive quality is egoism, more precisely “a perpetual and
restless desire for Power after power.”109 The clash of our egoisms causes a
social chaos whose only antidote is “that mortal God,” a sovereign who is able
to establish order because it is to the advantage of all others to submit to his

104. Id. at 10.
105. J. Peter Cordella, Reconciliation and the Mutualist Model of Community, in
CRIMINOLOGY AS PEACEMAKING 30, (Harold E. Pepinsky & Richard Quinney eds., 1991).
106. Joseph Camilleri, Human Rights, Cultural Diversity, and Conflict Resolution, 6
PACIFICA REV. 17, 24 (1994).
107. Cordella, supra note 105, at 37–38.
108. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 92 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994)
(1651).
109. Id. at 70.
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authority.110 “The state, created ex nihilo, was an artificial ordering of
individual parts, not bound together by cohesion as an organic community, but
united by fear.”111
This gets at the heart of the issue: the contrast between the mutuality of
genuine community and the fear that motivates Hobbes’s contractual and
punitive state composed of competing individuals. According to Hobbes, the
state’s order is externally imposed upon its subjects, because in a social
contract, the self-interest of others is perceived as a constant threat to our own
self-interest—“except [that] they be restrained through fear of some coercive
power, every man will distrust and dread each other.”112
What does this have to do with a Buddhist perspective on jurisprudence?
The important issue is the social context of justice and the historical
developments that have shaped our understanding of that context—a context
we usually take for granted, but which is becoming increasingly questionable.
As Hobbes makes clear, fear is the origin of the modern state and its
jurisprudence, for the state is the only thing that can protect my self-interest
from yours.113 Whether or not this is true historically, it has become our myth:
we legitimize the state’s justice insofar as we accept that it is needed to protect
us from each other. But is there any alternative?
Harold Pepinsky, in a discussion of Buddhism, has pointed out that the
problem of justice is part of a broader issue: how can all our relationships be
just and peaceful?114 And even more generally, how can humans get along?
When conflict occurs, how can we restore peace instead of responding in kind?
If this is the main problem, the issue of a good judicial system must be
subordinate to our larger vision of how people are related to each other.115
Buddhist teachings agree with Pepinsky that conflict is inevitable as long as we
are the kind of people we are; the issue, then, is how to learn from these
conflicts. Pepinsky writes,
Unless we can make peace in the privacy of our own homes, men with women,
adults with children and with older people, we cannot build peace outside in
our other workplaces and in our nations. Research on peacemaking in
criminology thus becomes the study of how and where people manage to make
peace, under the assumption that the principles that create or destroy peace are
116
the same from the Smith family kitchen to the Pentagon and the prison.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
TOULMIN, supra note 97, at 211–12.
THOMAS HOBBES, MAN AND CITIZEN 99 (Bernard Gert ed., Anchor Books 1972) (1658).
Id.
Harold E. Pepinsky, Peacemaking in Criminology and Criminal Justice, in
CRIMINOLOGY AS PEACEMAKING, supra note 105, at 299, 303–04.
115. Id.
116. Pepinsky, supra note 114, at 305.
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The implication, of course, is that judicial systems should focus on
transforming offenders, restoring relationships, and reharmonizing
communities.117 This itself harmonizes with the definition of justice that
Ronnie Earle, the Austin District Attorney, offers: “Justice is the fairness and
balance that come from healthy relationships.”118 In place of the usual
inquiries—”Whodunnit? What laws were violated? How are we going to
punish the offender?”—he prefers to ask: “What is the harm? What needs to
be done to repair the harm? Who is responsible for this repair?”119 Earle
offers three reasons for developing such “community restorative justice:”
First, it is what people want, because it empowers them. Second, it is what
victims want because they get to participate. And third, it is what the public
wants because it speaks to that internal sense of justice that we all share. All of
120
these reasons make restorative justice good politics.

And good jurisprudence? We are left with two contradictory paradigms about
the origins and role of justice. How do we decide between them? Which kind
of society do we want to live in?

117.
118.
119.
120.

See id.
Earle, supra note 16, at 19.
Id.
Id.

